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Abstract Recent debate on the relationship between cyber threats, on the one hand, and
both strategy and ethics on the other focus on the extent to which ‘cyber war’ is possible,
both as a conceptual question and an empirical one. Whether it can is an important
question for just war theorists. From this perspective, it is necessary to evaluate cyber
measures both as a means of responding to threats and as a possible just cause for using
armed kinetic force. In this paper, I shift the focus away from ‘war’ as such in order to ask
whether some cyber threats might justifiably be characterized as a form of ‘violence.’
Some theorists argue that the term violence ought to be defined so as to encompass things
like ‘structural’ harm or harm by neglect and thereby question implicitly the focus of just
war theorists on armed force. This paper draws on a theory of violence I developed
elsewhere as a defence of just war theory’s narrow understanding of violence. According
to the ‘Double-Intent’ theory, a distinctive form of ‘Violent Agency’ is the factor uniting
the category of violence while partly accounting for the peculiar moral connotations of
the term. Here, I argue that the resulting definition of violence reshapes the category in a
way that includes some forms of cyber-attack. This may help us to see where cyber might
fit in relation to just war theory and the ethics of kinetic attack.
Keywords Cyber-attack . Cyberwar . Violence . Deterrence . Just war theory
1 Just War and Cyber War
What guidance, if any, should the just war theory be able to offer about cyberwar?
Some scholars argue that the very term ‘cyberwar’ is a misnomer and that identifying
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cyber-attacks with war reflects basic misconceptions about both. Yet, the advent of
cyber-threats of various kinds as a fact of international security has led governments,
expert bodies, and scholars to incorporate these phenomena within a just war frame-
work.1 In the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,
for instance, the International Group of Experts state that ‘both the jus ad bellum
[concerning justifications for initiating war] and the jus in bello [concerning just
conduct in war] apply to cyber operations’ (Schmitt 2015, v). As a result, the Manual
tracks the logic of the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
treating cyber measures as a new category of ‘weapon’ and therefore as being subject to
the requirements and restrictions of International Humanitarian Law (henceforth, IHL;
ibid., v-vi). This ties cyber security and cyber-attacks closely to two of the main
subdivisions of just war theory (JWT), jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
On the face of it, this seems like it might be the right direction to take in thinking
about the ethics of cyber-attacks and how to respond to them. The degree and, arguably,
the type of destructiveness that some cyber-attacks are capable of inflicting suggest that
the sorts of response they might justify could be similar to those warranted by ‘kinetic’
attacks by means of conventional armed force in a range of possible cases. If cyber-
attacks can significantly deteriorate the effectiveness of either military technologies or
peacetime infrastructure, for instance, or even cause physical harm to individuals, then
they appear likely, on the face of things, to justify more conventional defensive or
retaliatory measures in imaginable circumstances. And in a world that is increasingly
reliant on and, indeed, composed of informational structures, artefacts, institutions, and
resources, a sufficiently serious attack whose destructiveness was limited to damaging
information as such in the cyber-domain could also, one would imagine, pass this
threshold of severity too. The USA, for instance, has adopted the principle that
retaliation against cyber-attacks may take the form not only of cyber-counter-attack
but also attack by conventional military means (Obama 2011, 14). By the same token, if
cyber-attacks are sometimes the means of deterring hostile actions of one sort or
another, then they too may be subject to stringent justificatory demands akin to those
governing conventional armed attack.
Trying to specify exactly what it means to place cyber-attacks within the map of just
war concepts and criteria is not a simple matter, however, and raises a variety of further
questions as scholars have recognized (see Taddeo (2014), 37–8). The view proposed
in this paper is that, if some cyber-attacks are comparable to some kinetic attacks, and if
JWT is the right ethical-legal framework for addressing normative questions about
kinetic attack, then this would also seem to be the right framework within which to
address at least some questions about the ethics of cyber security. But it will not be the
right place to discuss all such questions. My argument develops the point that only
some types of cyber-attack are equivalent to armed, kinetic attack, and give prima facie
warrant for armed, kinetic defence. And for the same reason, these types of attack
would be peculiarly hard to justify, just like the use of conventional weapons. I will call
this subset of cyber threats ‘Violent Cyber Attacks.’ This leaves a wide range of types
of cyber-attack outside the remit of JWT.
To make the case, I argue in Sect. 2 that attempts to locate the ethics of cyber
security in relation to JWT are stymied by a common tendency to assimilate cyber
1 For sceptical views, see Rid (2013) and May (2015).
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threats by invoking the concept of war. Instead, theorists of cyber security should focus
on the notion of violence and follow the trend of recent JWT in moving away from
traditional notions of war. In Sect. 3, I examine the role that the concept of violence
plays in the ethics of armed conflict and then outline in Sect. 4 an approach to its
definition that encompasses some cyber-attacks. In Sect. 5, I indicate some distinctions
that this analysis suggests might be important within the category of ‘cyber-attacks’
before indicating in Sect. 6 how these kinds of action might be incorporated within the
various dimensions of JWT.
2 The Concepts of War and Violence
It might seem probable that one could integrate the concerns of cyber security into the
just war theory by coupling them together using the concept of ‘war’: JWT is
concerned with war; cyber threats are thought by some to amount to a form of war
and may contribute to the waging of war in a conventional sense (Durante 2015, 369–
70); and since both deal with war, JWT should be able to apply quite directly to ‘cyber
war.’ But I doubt this can really help clarify the place that cyber should have in JWT
because not only is the applicability and meaning of the word war quite controversial in
relation to cyber-attacks but it is also arguably quite doubtful and unclear what it means
even in JWT.
The first problem with a war approach is that theorists disagree as to whether cyber-
attacks themselves can constitute a form of warfare or whether a coordinated set of such
attacks could be interpreted as comprising a war taken together. Thomas Rid, for
example, has argued that the fact that cyber threats do not (or do not directly) involve
‘violence’ in a conventional sense, by which he means using physical force to cause
potentially lethal harms, is one reason to doubt it (e.g. Rid 2012; cf. Stone 2013). On
this sort of view, then, JWT ought to regard cyber-attacks as ‘measures short of war’—
far short in fact—and therefore subject to a different set of guidelines. Others argue, by
contrast, that the prevalence of cyber-attacks as a supplement to the kinetic forces
available to states ‘means that a deeper comprehension of what war is in the cyber age’
is needed (Durante 2015, 370).
Further complicating the issue is the fact that the putative connection between cyber-
attack and war is imagined (and sometimes experienced) in different ways, each
suggesting a different relationship with war and pointing towards different potential
implications for the way we might work out the ethical and legal ramifications of the
phenomenon. What we might call a pure cyber war, for instance, might involve
conducting an international conflict purely by means of reciprocal cyber-attack. More
probable, perhaps, is a practice of war in a more conventional sense that increasingly
involves cyber-attacks as a supplement to conventional weapons (Durante 2015).
Cyber-attacks can be used in such a way as to affect a state’s ability to wage
conventional war quite directly, for instance, though this might occur during an
established state of war or as a warlike act in peacetime—such as in the case of Stuxnet
when it was used to attack Iranian nuclear capacity building. Moreover, there are at
least hypothetical—perhaps plausible—scenarios in which the threat from a cyber
measure is commensurate with some forms of armed kinetic attack, even if it is not
aimed directly at war-making capabilities or launched during an armed conflict.
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But even without the pressure of these new phenomena, the concept of war has in
any case become more widely contested and increasingly indistinct. Up to the mid-
twentieth century, the dominant modern understanding of war resembled Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s: war was a formally recognized condition of enmity between states with
clearly defined limits in terms of who was and who wasn’t involved, in what capacity,
and over what period of time or tract of geographic space (Rousseau 1762 / 2004, 10;
Walzer 1977). But over the last generation or so, just war theorists have increasingly
tended to think about war in a much more open-ended way: it encompasses small-scale
conflict possibly running from the case of two people fighting in the street (one an
aggressor, the other defending themselves) on a moral continuum that runs up to much
more organized, coordinated large-scale uses of violence by lots of individuals
(McMahan 2004; cf. Fabre 2012).
A decreasing emphasis on a formal conception of war has also been a feature of
contemporary international law. Since World War II, jurists have addressed the problem
of encompassing the right range of conflicts by making International Humanitarian
Law apply to ‘armed conflicts’ rather than war as such. This facet of post-World-War-II
international law marks a shift away from a paradigm in which states were the only—or
at least the predominant and paradigmatic—parties to war and according to which wars
came into being when sovereign powers declared them. But the category of armed
conflict is if anything even less promising as a way of unifying a field that includes both
harms inflicted by conventional military means and cyber-attacks. Apart from anything
else, the term ‘armed’ is question begging in this context.2
So, I do not think war as a concept (or armed conflict) serves as a good, basic
starting point for figuring out the place of cyber in relation to JWT. It neither helps
show that (some or all) cyber-attacks clearly belong in JWT nor does it show that they
necessarily do not. But we might get further by thinking about another concept: that of
violence. What JWT and international law do seem to concern themselves with along
that continuum of conflicts are the troubling questions of how to respond to threats
from a spectrum of intentional, destructive harms denoted by that term and second,
whether, when and how to use violence as a means of responding. So, if this is the
common thread running through the various concerns of JWT, then we might get
further in thinking about the place that cyber threats ought to have in the ethics of war
by investigating the concept of violence. We would have to ask (1) what the term
violence actually means or ought to be understood to mean and (2) whether some
cyber-attacks might not themselves sometimes amount to a form of violence or have
enough features in common with paradigm cases of violence to be directly comparable
with violence.
To begin this exploration, I turn now to the concept of violence and the peculiar
normative connotations of the term. These are important in explaining the way
violence is given special treatment—both as cause and means—in JWT. Identifying
these connotations helps specify the significance that defining some cyber-attacks as
acts of violence could have for the ethics of cyber security and strategic cyber-
deterrence.
2 The appropriateness of the term ‘cyber armed conflict’ is suggested in relation to the applicability of IHL, for
instance, by Schmitt and Vihul (2016, 35).
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3 Violence
JWT’s focus on the ethical problems of defending against wrongful violent threats
and of using physical violence to do so is motivated by the peculiar normative
significance commonly attributed to the various phenomena associated with the con-
cept of violence.
First, as Hannah Arendt argued, it is commonly assumed that when human affairs
turn violent, particularly in politics, they in some sense come to be ‘set… apart from’
other phenomena (Arendt 2006, 8). So violence is somehow especially troubling in a
way that other forms of action or behaviour are not and a step over the threshold into
the use of violence is something we mark as significant and worrying. Second, and
apparently as a consequence, those who resort to violence carry a peculiarly weighty
responsibility to justify themselves: as Kai Nielsen puts it: ‘[p]olitical violence, like
violence generally, is in need of a very special justification indeed (1982, 25). Actions
identified as violent in the relevant sense, on this view, are implicitly seen as either
prima facie or pro tanto wrong: it may be possible to justify them, but only given
certain exceptional circumstances and for especially important ends.3 A third feature of
the idea is that wrongful violence has a special role in triggering justified violence. So it
is something along the lines that the paradigmatic justification for violence is violence
itself. Or, at least, identifying something as violence has a tendency to make counter-
violence appear justifiable.
As regards these features of the idea of violence, for present purposes, therefore,
three questions arise: (1) Why is violence seen as having these connotations? (2) Are
the reasons for this belief philosophically sound and are they sufficient to justify its
special status? That is, do paradigm cases of violence, whatever that is, display features
that could account for these normative connotations? And if we should take these
connotations seriously about the notion of violence, then it suggests that the question of
whether cyber-attacks sometimes constitute a form of violence in a literal sense is
important: if so, then violent cyber-attacks are likely to have the same moral signifi-
cance. So (3), can they? And, if so, might ‘cyber violence’ have similar ethical
connotations and consequences?
The question of how violence is—and how it ought to be—defined has proven
controversial, and a variety of competing views attempt to challenge conventional
wisdom in different ways. The popular understanding that much debate is pitched in
relation to is sometimes called the ‘strict’ account since it gives rise to a relatively
narrow category of action types. Associated with actions such as shooting, punching,
stabbing, and blowing things up, it is generally thought to exclude the range of things
encompassed by ‘cyber-attack.’ It might be defined as follows:
THE STRICT DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE: the intentional infliction of (severe) harm
by human agents on others usually effecting itself in physical injury in paradigm
cases but (on some accounts) also encompassing psychological damage. Acts of
3 A relative of this view even takes violence to be wrong by definition: Robert Paul Wolff offered an
influential if rather peculiar argument in 1969 premised on what he took to be a frequent tendency to
differentiate between ‘force’ which could be ‘legitimate’ and violence which was defined in contradistinction
to it.
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violence are typically also descriptively violent in that they are sudden, forceful,
and sensational. Harms are inflicted by directing such actions towards either a
victim’s body or something they value (such as their property).4
On this understanding, violence has three important features:
1. Agency: it involves inflicting harm through intentional action.
2. Bodily Harm: variants of the definition tend to treat bodily—physical—harm as
paradigmatic. Other possibilities are included insofar as they appear similar or are
in some sense derivatives or close relatives of bodily harm, e.g. psychological harm
to the person or damage to property.
3. Violence in a Descriptive Sense: and mediating between them is the expectation
that ‘acts of violence’ (as John Harris puts it) will also be ‘violent acts’ in some
sense. They will be sudden, perhaps loud, and forceful.
This encapsulates, I think, a fairly common way of defining violence implicit in
ordinary speech in Anglophone contexts but also followed, more or less, in some of the
analytical literature.5 But it has come under pressure at different times from a variety of
revisionary efforts by philosophers, who seek to redefine the concept and usage to
reflect what they take to be a more suitable range of moral and social concerns.
John Harris, for instance, argues that the strict conception does not actually define a
distinctive category of things (Harris 1980; cf. Coady 2008, 30).6 To show this, he
generates dilemmas for his readers between including cases that, on the one hand,
intuitively seem like they ought to be categorized as acts of violence but that, on the
other hand, do not have the descriptive features necessary to be defined as such on the
strict understanding of the word. Consequently, they put pressure on the common
definition insofar as it tracks the sensational features of the ‘fire and sword’ idea of
violence. For instance, he offers the use of slow poison as a problem case. Surely, we
might think, it has to be an act of violence to put poison in someone’s food that puts
them into a lethal sleep. And yet, this does not appear to have the features that an
analytical ethicist like Tony Coady attributes to violence: it is simply not violent.7 It
involves no dramatic uses of physical force; there is no suddenness, loudness, tearing,
or shattering.
4 For this synopsis, see Finlay (2017, 71). For examples, see, for instance, the strict conception disputed by
Harris (1980, 15), also Madden Dempsey (2006, 310–11) and Jacquette (2013), cf. Geras (1989, 187).
5 For common usage, see the Oxford English Dictionary, where violence is defined as, ‘Behaviour involving
physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something.’ Note that it offers a specifically legal
usage as an alternative: ‘Law: The unlawful exercise of physical force or intimidation by the exhibition of such
force.’ The latter is what Wolff (1969) takes violence to be. For scholarly argument along these lines, see
Coady (2008).
6 See also Galtung (1969; cf. Coady 2008, 24–9) and Garver (2009), which extends the category to include
‘covert institutional violence’; and Lee (1996, 330), on ‘the moral continuity between the harms of social
disorder and the harms of social order.’
7 In cases where poisoning is ‘slow-acting’ and requires ‘repeated doses,’ whose ‘destructive effects are
gradual and cumulative,’ Coady writes, ‘I suspect we should not call the poisoning a violent act’ (whereas
using ‘swift-acting’ poisons like those deployed in war would be a ‘fairly clear’ case of a ‘violent act’). The
former types of case belong, he says, to ‘territory lying on an uncomfortable borderline between violence and
non-violence’ (2008, 41).
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Michael Schmitt alludes to this problem in his discussion of the notion of ‘attack’
in international law and its applicability to cyber operations. Additional Protocol 1
(article 49(1)) makes clear that attack is to be understood in terms of violence in
something like the strict sense of the word, excluding things like propaganda and
activities with economic consequences such as embargos. Attacks, in this text, are
‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence’ (Schmitt
2012, 286). Schmitt reads violence, here, as a term indicating the release of physical
forces, but he resists an overly restrictive interpretation of the letter of the law by
reference to the prohibition on chemical and biological weapons. These might be
said to fall outside that definition of violence, and yet, they clearly fall under the
purview of Additional Protocol 1. In which case, he concludes, the intention of the
legal statute should be interpreted according to the consequences of the action
rather than whether it is strictly speaking violent in respect to the unleashing of
force:
A careful reading of Additional Protocol I’s prohibitions and restrictions on
attacks discloses that the concern was not so much with acts which were violent,
but rather with those that have harmful consequences (or risk them), in other
words, violent consequences. In great part, the treaty’s object and purpose is to
avoid, to the extent possible in light of military necessity, those very conse-
quences (Schmitt 2012, 290).
Following the line of argument pursued by Harris, however, there are two further
problems down that road. First, not all weapons need have ‘violent consequences,’ just
as not all involve the violent projection of force in their execution. Poisons, for
instance, need not involve any violence in their sensory characteristics to effect their
consequences. But if we take violent consequences to mean something like ‘sufficiently
harmful consequences,’ in a broader sense, then we end up proving too much: as Harris
in particular argues (but also Johan Galtung and other critics of the strict conception),
harmful consequences—often truncating or otherwise disfiguring the people’s
lives—arise from all sorts of anthropogenic processes and structures (Harris 1980;
Galtung 1969).
We are therefore still left wanting an account of how violence can be defined in such
a way as to match the category it delineates to the set of things that have the moral
characteristics connoted by the term. And we also lack an account of how cyber
operations relate to violence and, hence, to the notion of attack operative in IHL and
JWT. If we follow ordinary usage and the letter of the law in Additional Protocol 1,
then cyber-attacks appear to be excluded en bloc; but if we focus on consequences
without insisting on intentions or some other distinguishing feature of the act, we
include too many other things potentially as equivalents to conventional, armed, kinetic
attack and, hence, potentially as just cause for defensive armed force. The question is
whether a conception of violence is possible that will encompass the right range of
intuitive cases while also avoiding dramatically revisionary consequences such as those
that Harris and others propose. If so, then it may be possible to preserve the link
between the more familiar category of acts and the moral connotations that seem
important to JWT. And if it is possible to assimilate the types of case that Harris,
Coady, and Schmitt found problematic in light of the Strict definition—such as
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poisoning and chemical weapons—then it may also be possible to assimilate some
types of cyber-attack.
The theory I will now set out in Sect. 4 can achieve these aims but with some
revisionary consequences that are less dramatic than those that critics of the strict
conception aim at. One of these is the suggestion that seemingly intangible attacks like
those involved in cyber war might qualify either as acts of violence themselves or as
integral parts of acts of violence. Either way, as I will argue in Sect. 5, it shows how
certain kinds of cyber-attack might be assimilated to the category of action types that
concern JWT.
4 The Double-Intent Conception of Violence
According to the ‘Double-Intent Conception of Violence’ (Finlay 2017), the range of
cases that we associate paradigmatically with violence in ordinary speech as well as in
ethics corresponds to a definition as follows:
VIOLENCEi: is defined by the presence of Violent Agency consisting of the
intentional infliction of [1] destructive harm by human agents on targets using
a technique chosen with the further intention [2] of eliminating or evading the
target’s means of escaping it or defending against it. In paradigm cases of
violence by single-minded attackers, [2] will be realized as far as is necessary
to secure [1] or, failing that, as far as possible to maximize the chance of doing so
(Finlay 2017, 73).
So, the first defining feature of ‘Violent Agency’ and, hence, Violencei is a particular
kind of ‘double intention’; the second is its orientation towards ‘destructive’ harming.
Let me go through these two steps in turn in more detail.
4.1 Double Intent
Violence is defined, on this account, first by a double intention: on the one hand to
inflict harm and, on the other, to narrow the window of opportunity within which its
victim can respond, to whatever extent is necessary for success and possible. To
illustrate, consider the way many of the means of violence are designed. Someone
throwing a spear in an ancient war clearly intends their target to be harmed: wounded if
not killed. But the choice of weapon and the technique in which it is used realize a
second, supporting intention too: this is to reduce the alternatives available to the target
that might permit them to evade the harm. Whereas the sharpness of the point might be
seen as a force multiplier, concentrating the thrust from the thrower’s arm on a minute
point of contact, the speed with which the spear flies serves both to communicate this
force and as a dominance multiplier. By dominance multiplier, I mean that it increases
the vulnerability of its target to the harm. This, it achieves by reducing the window of
opportunity within which to react, whether by stepping to one side, or by parrying the
blow with a shield or a sword.
Throwing a spear works in a similar way to firing a bullet from a gun. If the
shooter takes aim from a vantage point and, moreover, does so in a way that is
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concealed from the target, it thereby increases the degree of domination: on the one
hand, the attacker’s ability to inflict harm at will rises while, on the other, the target’s
ability to evade or parry it declines. Paradigmatic acts of violence, I argue, always
combine these two intents, commonly aiming at a transient, momentary relationship of
intensified dominance within which to execute the intended harm. The familiar cate-
gory of action types sometimes referred to as ‘kinetic violence’ or ‘kinetic armed force’
commonly employs the factors of speed, distance, secrecy, and surprise to narrow the
response window and inflict harm without impediment. The more effectively a tech-
nology does so, the better suited it is to employment as a means of violence. The
combination of a chosen technology (bomb, gun, knife, or fist) with a particular method
of employment (booby trapping, sniping, stabbing, or punching) may be referred to as a
whole as a technique of violence in general and as an act of violence in each particular
case.
Whereas, classic violent means such as shooting or punching create a radically
intensified relationship of dominance in a sudden, transient way, the Double-Intent
Account also encompasses the possibility of opportunistic violence. Finding someone
to be in an established position of vulnerability—due to class or gender relations, for
instance, or through a disabling health condition—and exploiting this fact in order to
inflict destructive harm are other ways in which double intent might be realized. It is also
possible to prepare a victim in advance, realizing intent (2) prior to executing number
(1): rendition or kidnapping, for instance, establish the relationship of dominance
necessary to render someone maximally vulnerable to torture or whatever harms the
perpetrator envisages. In cases of either kind, I emphasize that agents will harness or
create an asymmetry of the relevant kind as far as necessary for the execution of the
harm or, if that is not available to them, as far as possible for doing so. It may be,
however, that the agent will not do enough to succeed, in which case, they will commit
an unsuccessful act of violence—but it will still be an act of violence, nevertheless.
The usefulness of highlighting these dimensions of the act of violence is seen when
we turn to some of the cases that Harris and Coady found problematic—those that sit
uncomfortably on the margins of the violent and the non-violent. Poisoning, on the
Double-Intent Account, appears not as a liminal case, but as a paradigmatic example of
violence. Take as a hypothetical example, the following:
SECRET ENEMY: Susan andMary appear to all who observe their outward behaviour
to be friends. Indeed, Mary shares their conviction that Susan is a loyal companion
who only has Mary’s best interests at heart. In fact, Susan has long held a grudge
against Mary for some past, perceived insult, and decides to murder her by slipping
an undetectable poison into her tea. Once she has done so, she passes Mary the tea
and chats with her until it has been sipped down to the dregs. Only once it is too late
for Mary to do anything about it, does Susan tell her the truth.
If violence is defined by the presence of a double intent, as I have suggested, then this is
an exemplary act of violence. Not only does Susan intend that Mary be harmed, indeed
killed; but also the technique she uses to bring the harm about combines a technology
that can execute it with a method that renders Mary entirely vulnerable to it. By keeping
the danger secret until the poison has already been ingested, Susan deprives Mary of
any means of escape or defence.
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If this seemingly non-standard case that has caused such trouble for proponents of a
narrow or strict definition of violence can be assimilated, then so, I argue, can others
such as the use of weaponized poisons and the use of sieges. Sieges, for instance, not
only use violence when they kill those attempting to flee the besieged city but also
constitute acts of violence writ large. This is because encircling and threatening the
citizens render exposure to starvation, dehydration, and disease inescapable. By con-
trast, embargos and sanctions aim at a variety of different things that are less likely to
fall under the definition of violence that I offer. Arms embargos, for instance, or
embargos on other materials useful for internal repression or external aggression are
put in place to diminish the ability of a state to cause further harm or, perhaps more
often, to prevent its ability from continuing or increasing. In common with sanctions,
they might be interpreted as refusing further benefits of different kinds rather than
depriving their target of present goods in such a way as to cause anything that could be
interpreted as ‘destructive harm’ as I define it below in 4.2.8
There is not space to defend this part of the definition fully and I have responded to a
variety of possible objections elsewhere (Finlay 2017). But I will mention one, which is
the worry that defining violence in this way appears to render death and injury caused as
a collateral effect of warfare non-violent insofar as it is, by definition, unintended. Two
points are worth suggesting by way of a brief response. The first is that this is true of any
definition of violence that specifies intended harming and not just of a definition that
specifies a double-intent. I take intention to be part of the strict understanding and
something that is widely associated with violence. Secondly, defining violence by the
intentions of the agent does not preclude a description of side-effect victims as having
suffered as a result of an act of violence. Nor does it rule out saying that the agents
committed an act of violence that harmed the collateral victims. It only precludes saying
that the agents committed an act of violence against them. So, I do not think it leads to
any semantic consequences that we could not quite easily live with.
Finally, by following the strict conception in the way it highlights intention, I set aside
the notion of ‘structural violence’ (Galtung 1969). I do not doubt that harms might be
suffered as a result of structural factors. And neither do I deny that structures do so when
they place individuals in a position of acute vulnerability and thereby render them
susceptible to severe harms of one sort or another. But I see the move of characterizing
as violence the suffering that structures cause as a rhetorical one. It harnesses the
forcefulness that the term violence derives from its paradigm cases in which agents
cause harm intentionally by certain means. As such, structural violence is essentially a
metaphor and its effectiveness in highlighting unjust harms is best supported, in my
view, by clarifying the paradigmatic cases and the concept lying behind them.
4.2 Destructive Harming
Some might also think it an objection to a definition that relies solely on the double
intent criterion that it would include things that we do not necessarily see as forms of
violence. For instance, hacking into someone’s bank account and stealing funds seems
like an exemplary case of violence on that basis (i.e. by exploiting or creating
vulnerabilities as part of the technique for harming)—but would it be violent in the
8 Thanks to Joseph Nye for pressing me on this distinction.
C. J. Finlay
usual understanding of that term? Likewise, in a more material context, burglary might
often (perhaps always) be an act of violence insofar as it creates or exploits vulnera-
bilities (regardless of whether weapons or threats against persons or destruction of
property were involved) and then executes a robbery that harms the owner of the house.
Both types of action can involve [1] intent to harm by means [2] intended to deprive a
victim of the means to respond and defend. So the question is whether we should admit
a much wider range of behaviours into the category of violence than is usually intended
by those using the word or whether we can find a legitimate way to refine the definition
that excludes these cases. This is where the differentiation between what I call
‘destructive harming’ and what I call ‘appropriative harm’ is important.
Of course, burglary and assault do have similarities: it might be possible to bite the
bullet, so to speak, and grant that violence encompasses both—it would not be very
counter-intuitive. And for purposes of thinking about cyber, this could conceivably be
helpful too: hacking as a means of theft might be treated similarly to assault and to the
use of other cyber ‘weapons’ to cause harm without theft. But I think the common-
sense tendency to distinguish between categories here has some deeper grounding. The
gist of my attempt to disentangle the two is as follows (in Finlay (2017, 77–82)). I
distinguish the destructive harming characteristic of violence from ‘appropriative
harming,’ which is typical of things like theft. On the one hand, appropriative harming
occurs where the harm an assailant causes to her victim is the same as the benefit
enjoyed as a result by the assailant—i.e. they are commensurable in kind and com-
mensurate in scale. By contrast, where the benefit to an assailant is very different
(incommensurable perhaps or just very different in scale), then we are more likely to
interpret it as a ‘violent attack’ rather than some sort of theft.
So, for instance, if I broke the lock of your car, hot-wired the engine, and drove off,
later selling it for cash or perhaps keeping it for use as my own car, then the harm and
the benefit are of the same kind and scale: a car or the value of a car. But if instead I
took a baseball bat and smashed in your car windows before setting the vehicle on fire
as an act of revenge, they are not: you suffer the loss of a valuable possession (as well
as the anguish or fear my actions cause); I enjoy whatever satisfaction comes from
avenging a perceived wrong. So, while either would constitute a setback to your
interests of the sort characteristic of ‘harm’ in general, it seems possible to identify
something here that differentiates between two subcategories: things that operate like
theft (appropriative harming) and things that operate like paradigm cases of violence
(destructive harming). This does not, of course, itself suggest that violence per se is
necessarily worse than theft—it all depends on other factors on this line of comparison.9
But some further clarity on this can be achieved by looking at how the Double-Intent
Account of violence explains the moral connotations of the term.
4.3 The Moral Connotations of ‘Violence’
So, why and in what sense is violence, as I define it, morally troubling in a distinctive
way? Why does it have the sorts of normative connotations I mentioned before and
9 Violence is especially troubling, on my account, due to its greater propensity to guarantee harms by creating
simultaneous vulnerabilities. So it might be that theft in some forms and violence in all forms share this
worrying characteristic. In which case, violence is not necessarily worse than theft ceteris paribus.
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how might this affect cyber-attacks if some of them turn out to belong within the
category of violence?
The fearfulness of violence arises first of all from the fact that, on the Double-Intent
definition, whereas other kinds of agency (and structures) have only a contingent (if,
perhaps, frequent) relationship with harm, harm is essential to acts of violence and their
purposeful orientation towards harming is definitional. By contrast, while structures
and actions that are not specifically aimed at destructive harm in the way acts of
violence are might sometimes cause comparable harms, if they do, it is incidental to
their purposes, or even accidental. The destructive aspect of violence on the Double-
Intent Account reinforces its first feature. Whereas, if the gain to the attacker is the
same as the victim’s loss, there is at least an in principle possibility of restoring the lost
value to its owner, destructive harm is usually marked by the elimination of some part
of the victim’s sources of well-being.10 Although violence against property might be
remediable in some instances, attempts at restoring well-being can at best compensate
for harm in some other way in many cases. And in the most severe cases, where
violence is directed against minds and bodies, compensation is impossible: limbs
cannot be restored and there can be no compensation to someone who loses their life
to violence.
These characteristics in turn clarify, second, why it is peculiarly hard to justify
employing violence and accounts for the need for a special ethics. Whether aimed at
destructive harm to the body or at other things, Violent Agency will itself increase the
probability that the harm will occur to the fullest possible extent. But more than this, we
can also say that even if we hold the actual harms resulting to be equal between two
different acts, one by a Violent Agent and one by an agent of another sort (reckless or
negligent, for instance), then the former will usually bear a greater degree of moral
responsibility and, in case of wrongful harming, be more culpable than the latter.
Judgements about the presence of Violent Agency thus issue in and not from judgments
about culpability. And this helps account for the liability of Violent Agents to remedial
harm when their actions render defensive or retaliatory measures necessary.
The significance of this facet of violence on the Double-Intent Account is thrown
into sharper relief if we contrast it with the way good or evil outcomes might be
generated through what Luciano Floridi calls ‘distributed agency’ (DA) (Floridi 2013).
DA occurs when a morally significant outcome (whether positive or negative in value)
occurs as a result of individual actions in their combined results but without any of the
individual actors committing acts that are individually significant. So their actions
might be morally neutral due to their relatively trivial scale, falling below a threshold
of moral significance. Moreover, the individual actors may or may not be conscious
that their acts might contribute to a greater good or evil due to DA. Indeed, since the
actors, on Floridi’s account, can include artificial intelligence, they may lack the
capacity for such intentions or understanding, and yet they may comprise necessary
causal contributors to the moral significance of the collectively generated outcomes. As
Floridi makes clear, this sort of moral analysis ‘evaluates actions not from a sender but
rather from a receiver perspective: actions (including MAS’ [those of ‘multi-agent
systems’], artificial and supra-agents’) are assessed on the basis of their impact on the
10 On the moral complexities of restitution in a post bellum context, see Fabre (2016) chapter 5 and on the
difference between restitution of goods taken and reparations for goods destroyed, see p. 117.
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well-being of the environment at large and its inhabitants specifically’ (2013, 732). And
from that perspective, it might very well be the case that the moral significance of
negative outcomes is often comparable to those of intentional—indeed, doubly inten-
tional—outcomes arising from violence.
So, as far as impacts are concerned and the moral urgency of addressing and
mitigating them, it is likely that the significance of violent harms and those arising
from DAwill be directly comparable. However, when it comes to the question of using
harmful means, including armed force, to deflect or defend against such outcomes, it is
clear that those contributing to Violent Agency are likely to be liable to levels of harm
directly commensurable with those that are defended against. By contrast, those who
contribute in the individually negligible ways to DA envisaged in Floridi’s theory are
likely in many cases to be liable to little or no defensive or preventive harm. This is
because, whereas the Violent Agent is, by hypothesis, responsible for intending the evil
outcome, as a result of both a high degree of causal efficacy and an especially forceful
kind of intention, those who contribute to DA are responsible only for individual acts
that are, in themselves, morally ‘neutral.’
Finally, the idea of Violent Agency therefore also helps explain why successfully
persuading people to describe a particular act as unjustified violence can potentially have
a permissive effect and why there is such a close association in just war theory between
just cause and prior or threatened ‘armed kinetic attack’ (Fabre 2012, 108–10).11 This is
because actions involving Violent Agency are those which, by definition, are intended to
exclude means of evasion or resistance. The more successful the act of violence,
therefore, the narrower the range of options it leaves its target. If violent acts thereby
eliminate the chance to block, negotiate, or escape, then it is likely that they often leave
only violence itself as the victim’s remaining alternative. Violence is therefore likely in
many cases to generate the conditions of necessity and proportionality that justify violent
defence, including armed, kinetic violence (cf. Coady 2008, 42).
5 Cyber-Attacks and the Category of Violence
On the Double-Intent Account, some types of cyber-attack—but not all—will be
defined as acts of violence.
To illustrate how the two elements of the definition—double intent and destructive
harming—occur in some cyber-attacks, we only have to turn to Stuxnet, the most
famous recent case. First discovered in 2010, the malware that programmers used to
damage the Iranian nuclear processing plant combined two indispensable components.
The first executed the intended harm: it adjusted settings in the processing plant to alter
the speed with which its cylinders rotated, thereby causing serious physical damage and
costing the programme years in lost progress. This clearly satisfies the destructive
criterion. On the face of things, the intended outcome appears to have been a gain in
security for the USA and Israel against the future development of nuclear weapons by
11 If ‘institutional injustices’ come to be redefined as ‘forms of violence,’ Steven Lee writes, ‘this would be
relevant to determining whether a violent response on the part of those who are being treated unjustly is
justifiable, as, under common moral notions, the violence of aggression can sometimes justify the violence of
defense’ (1996, 68; also, van der Linden 2012).
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Iran; the harm suffered by the Iranians consisted in physical damage to their centrifuges
and to the programme for developing nuclear capability, whatever its actual purposes
may have been. But crucially, Stuxnet had a second component: the software used a
shielding mechanism ‘to circumvent and compromise digital safety systems,’making it
impossible for any computer it infected to detect its presence. This was needed because
otherwise the computer’s security software would identify it as a virus and attempt to
extract it before it did any harm. The shielding component, therefore, ensured that any
computer hosting the bug remained maximally vulnerable to the harm that Stuxnet was
intended to execute (Rid 2013, 43–6). Like Susan, the secret poisoner, those who
launched Stuxnet therefore sought to realize a double intent: to execute a destructive
harm by means of a technique that would also maximize the target’s vulnerabilities to it
by diminishing its opportunities for evasion or defence.
Thomas Rid has argued that cyber-attacks cannot be acts of war since, among other
things, they generally lack the direct relationship with ‘lethality’ that he regard as
definitional of warlike violence; moreover, ‘[i]n an act of cyber war,’ he says, ‘the
actual use of force is likely to be a far more complex and mediated sequence of causes
and consequences that ultimately result in violence and casualties’ (Rid 2012, 9). On
my theory, by contrast, some such actions can exhibit the necessary features of Violent
Agency and may be interpreted, therefore, as not only having causal connections with
other acts of violence, but also as themselves being acts of violence. Take, for instance,
the hypothetical ‘logic-bombs’ that Rid imagines causing train crashes, electricity
blackouts, and the collapse of air traffic systems; if they were possible, such actions
would clearly aim at destructive harm (just as Stuxnet did) and it is presumably going
to be part of their operation to evade or incapacitate the firewalls and other defences set
up to resist them (Rid 2012, 9). It is therefore possible to classify at least some
imaginable cyber-attacks not only as precipitators of violence but as acts of violence
themselves on the Agency Account.
Whereas, both Stuxnet and Rid’s logic bombs harness informational means to bring
about physical destruction of a more immediately material kind, it is also possible for
cyber-attacks with a purely informational target to satisfy the necessary conditions of
violence. By contrast with the hacker who steals funds or secrets, inflicting harm
appropriatively (analogously with a pickpocket or eavesdropper), one who uses com-
puter viruses to corrupt data or delete it, making it unusable, thereby inflicts destructive
harms. If she does so under cover of a shielding device making her attack undetectable
until it is too late (or in any other way that makes it impossible to defend against the
attack), then the attack has the same agential complexion as an act of conventional,
physical violence. Whether it is commensurable with one depends, then, not on the type
of action per se, but on the moral significance of what each act of violence harms: a
cyber-attack that destroyed data of greater value to a larger number of human beings
would be worse than an attack by physical means on property of lower value to fewer.
So, the first conclusion is that some cyber-attacks not only result in or resemble acts
of kinetic violence but are actually themselves properly described as acts of (non-
kinetic) violence. This challenges quite a widely accepted view about cyber-attacks (for
instance, Blank 2015, 94). By highlighting the ways in which a wider category of
violent acts—some kinetic, some not, but all aiming at destructive harm—is unified by
a particular kind of agency based on double-intent, it is possible to see how some forms
of cyber-attack but not others are violent. Attacks such as the Stuxnet virus are
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designed, as I have argued, to achieve their results in the same way as secret poisons or
a bullet fired from a gun: they execute an intended destructive harm while simulta-
neously realizing the second design of depriving their targets of an opportunity to evade
it. They involve a technique that harnesses components which, in other words, aim at
both harm and vulnerability to harm.
But my analysis of Violence into two parts suggests a second potentially important
way in which cyber-attack may be violent, which is that even when they are not used to
execute the first intention that defines violence, cyber-attacks may be especially useful
in achieving the second. They seem well suited, that is, as means to eliminate defences,
and might thereby occur as part of a larger ‘act of violence’ when accompanying more
traditional, kinetic methods of harm. R. R. Dipert, for instance, suggests the following
hypothetical case:
a massive cyberattack on defences a nation has against physical attack (such as
radar, spy satellites, command and control systems), would risk giving the
attacked nation reason to believe that a conventional attack was imminent, and
then possibly trigger the conditions of justified preemptive war…(2010, 401)
I would interpret the hypothetical rather differently. Such actions might very well
foreshadow a kinetic attack, but they should not necessarily be seen only as acts
preparatory to a discrete act or wave of violence: they are themselves part of those
acts. The same may be said of the historical case in which the Israeli Air Force
sabotaged Syrian radar as a means of eliminating its defences before bombing the Deir
ez-Zor nuclear reactor in September 2007 (Rid 2013, 11). If the method inflicted
damage on the radar site, then it might have constituted an act of violence in its own
right, on my account. But even if it only disabled it temporarily, it was as much a part of
the greater act of violence to which it contributed—the one directed against the nuclear
base—as the dropping of the bombs was. Violence, on my analysis, is defined both by
the way it eliminates (or evades) defence and by the way it inflicts harm. So even if
cyber measures were less effective than gunfire and rocket attack at executing harm,
they are highly adaptable to the purposes of creating conditions in which it will be
impossible to evade, deflect, or deter the execution of destructive harm.
Finally, the use of ransomware might sometimes constitute a third type of violence
by means of cyber-attack, at least in some instances. Ransomware that follows the
pattern of the recent WannaCry attack by encrypting someone’s data and then demand-
ing that payment be made in order to unlock it might be interpreted by analogy with
armed robbery. In both cases, the robber extracts payment through extortion by
threatening to inflict destructive harm on something valued by the victim. The armed
robber points a gun, rendering the victim maximally vulnerable to physical injury; the
cyber extortionist likewise threatens to render the victim’s data useless to them. And
both use this threatened violence to inflict an appropriative harm.
I propose ‘Violent Cyber-Attack’ as a term to designate that subcategory of cyber-
attacks that are also violent in the senses I have sketched out. But just as some types of
cyber-attack, then, may be interpreted as acts of violence—or as part of an act of
violence—others may be excluded from the category. Stealing secrets, whether from
industry, a state, or a private person, may violate rights but is not an act of violence,
whether the perpetrators hack into computers or sneak documents out of an office or
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someone’s house. Likewise, merely obstructing someone—whether by blocking a road
or denying them service by bombarding a computer with data requests—is likely to be
something other than violence, even when carried out maliciously. On the other hand, if
you blocked someone from escaping a collapsing building, it arguably should be seen
as an act of violence and it would be defined as such on the definition I offer. And if a
distributed denial-of-service attack against various different institutions and organiza-
tions, such as occurred in Estonia in 2007, had the effect of damaging those assets
themselves, caused harm to users, or rendered the state vulnerable to harms executed by
other means (such as by kinetic attack), then it should be seen as an act of violence or
part of one. If the imposition of profound vulnerability is carried out for the sake of
making it clear to Estonia that it may be subject to kinetic attack at any time and should
feel no sense of security against such a possibility, then it ought to be interpreted as a
threat of violence with all the coercive potential that such threats have when their
credibility is proven by a substantial downpayment.
6 Cyber-attacks and the Ethics of Force
Of course, naming a subset of cyber-attacks violent need not prejudice debate about
whether or not they are justified, legally or morally. JWT presumes that acts of
violence, however the term is understood, may be justifiable if certain conditions are
met. I turn now to JWT itself and the question of where Violent Cyber-Attacks ought to
be located within it.
6.1 Just War Questions
To establish the appropriate place for cyber-attacks within just war theory, we need to
be in a position to address three key questions.
First, can cyber-attacks or cyber-threats justify kinetic war (or warlike kinetic acts
short of full-scale war)? This question is directly triggered by the question of deterring
cyber-attack.12 If there are imaginable cases in which (a) a foreign power or organization
threatens a state with wrongful cyber-attack and (b) the only means of deterring or
defending against the attack is kinetic, then (c) can a cross-domain defensive or retalia-
tory measure be justified? If so, then it seems necessary to find a way to show how a
cyber-attack could meet a requirement implicit both in JWT in particular and ‘common
moral notions,’ which is that a resort to violence requires a special justification (Lee
1996, 68). Perhaps the criterion in JWT that most directly implies this is ‘last resort’: as it
is usually understood, this principle reflects the intuition that violence in general, war in
particular, ought to be resorted to only once all other, non-violent measures have been
exhausted or are manifestly futile. But it is also implicit in the generic assumption that
war must have a just cause: just cause implies not only that a wrong be threatened (or
have occurred) but also that it is of the right kind. Not every wrong is sufficiently
egregious in nature to warrant a resort to armed force. So there is a question here of
12 On possible use of kinetic retaliation as deterrence, see Iasiello (2014). Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul
remark on the controversial question of ‘when cyberoperations alone qualify as hostilities for the purpose of
initiating an armed conflict’ (in 2016, 36).
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commensurability: can some cyber-attacks be conducted in a manner or on a scale that is
commensurate with kinetic force?
But a second set of questions must also arise, I think, if we are coming at it from a
JWTangle: can cyberwar itself be justified as a form of war? And relatedly, if it can, then
how might the terms of the jus ad bellum (JAB) apply? Are they likely to be more
permissive of cyber-attacks than of kinetic measures? Should they be? These questions
along with the first are likely to have practical relevance more particularly in cases where
conflict involves a cross-domain dimension, those where kinetic force is augmented by
cyber-attacks and in which, therefore, cyber becomes an important element in increas-
ingly hybrid forms of war. And this leads to a third question: How might the occurrence
of specifically cyber components in armed, conventional conflict be reflected in JWT?
So, for instance, as regards the JAB, can the deflection or prevention of cyber-
attack or similar form part of a wider just cause? And, if so, might it contribute
to a case for the ‘proportionality’ of kinetic war? Proportionality requires that
decision-makers weigh relevant benefits of the successful prosecution of war
against relevant costs. Both are widely seen in JWT as restricted to certain kinds
of value: gains certainly include the protection of (innocent) lives from wrongful
threats and probably include things like national security in a wider sense against
territorial incursion and violations of sovereignty; costs are usually calculated in
terms of harms to at least the most basic human interests (paradigmatically life
and bodily integrity). If defence against cyber threats is seen as part of the case
for claiming ‘just cause’ for war, then it would imply that diminishing such
threats is a relevant gain and can offset relevant costs such as the loss of
innocent lives through collateral harms. So this would place cyber security, as
it were, on the ‘plus’ side of the balance sheet that the proportionality require-
ment demands we review before resorting to war. But it might also then have a
place too on the ‘minus’ side. If the relevant gains are measured partly in terms
of innocent human lives or the defence of national sovereignty against interna-
tional aggression, then to what extent could the sort of damage that cyber-attacks
launched by one’s enemies in such a war count against them? At what point
might the costs of such measures in our war rise to such a level as to render it
disproportionate, in spite of the fact that it aimed at securing human lives from
lethal, kinetic threats or over sovereign independence from the aggression of
foreign powers? In the absence of a common denominator between (some) cyber-
attacks and armed attacks by conventional means, it is not clear how such trade-
offs would be made—or, indeed, whether it is even possible to imagine ways to
think them through.
Similarly, problems then arise of how cyber measures should be compared with
kinetic armed attack in the jus in bello (JIB). A kinetic or hybrid war begins, let us
imagine, and your side has just cause. But your political and military commanders now
have further decisions to make, some involving choices between strategies or tactics
based on cyber and those involving conventional weapons. Presented with such
decisions, should they always prefer cyber-attacks to kinetic alternatives where both
have a reasonable (or possibly an equal) chance of success? Or might kinetic measures
be equally justifiable or sometimes easier to justify?13 As in the JAB, being able to
13 Again, see Schmitt and Vihul (2016, 36) See also Michael Schmitt (2012).
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make ethically defensible decisions in bello requires knowing whether the different
kinds of measure may be compared directly and in what circumstances one might be
chosen in preference to the other.
6.2 Just War Answers
If we assume that cyber-attacks are not acts of violence, then answering these questions
seems relatively straightforward: no, you cannot offset anticipated side-effect deaths
with reference to securing cyber assets; no, you need not count cyber damage as a cost
in estimating the proportionality of pursuing legitimate war aims; and yes, uncontro-
versially, it is always better to damage a computer than to injure or kill a person, so
cyber measures should always be preferred to kinetic in the framework of the jus in
bello. But if I am right to argue that some cyber-attacks actually are acts of violence or
essential components of such acts, then it suggests these questions need to be answered
in a different way, one that is more sensitive to the specificities of different types of
attack, whether cyber or kinetic.
If Violent Cyber-Attacks have the features of violence, as I define it, then they
will also have the normative features associated with the concept of violence.
Therefore, all else being equal, they can be treated in ethics the same way other
cases of violence are—including kinetic violence. Of course, it might very well
remain the case that the kind or quantity of harm that cyber-attacks cause as
compared with kinetic arms will typically be different: that is, the set of harms that
cyber-attack can cause is likely to overlap with the set of those that kinetic
violence can but not entirely; they will not be wholly congruent. But in the
overlapping cases, like can be treated as like. In which case, it seems likely that
kinetic, armed force could be used to defend against cyber threats—and vice
versa.
Whether or not kinetic defensive measures may be used against a Violent
Cyber-Attack in any particular case cannot therefore be decided in advance on
the basis of the way the two types of threat are characterized—kinetic or cyber—
but must be judged on the basis of three factors: first, the degree and type of harm
that each threatens (i.e. questions of proportionality); second, the comparison
between different alternatives as to the balance of costs and benefits they are
likely to bring about (necessity); and third—crucially—discrimination. So, as far
as justification is concerned, the devil is in the details (and not in broad strokes
description). The first two criteria may be applied simply by considering the sorts
of destructive harm that will arise from the different actions being compared: let
us say, between cyber-attacks that strategists in the defence ministry of a state
wish to defend against and deter and kinetic measures that might be effective in
responding to them and achieving those goals. If such kinetic measures inflict
harms that are not disproportionate to those threatened by cyber-attack, then they
can satisfy proportionality. And if the ratio between harms caused in kinetic
defence measures and cyber-attacks deterred or defended against is optimal when
compared with other proportionate measure that might be considered as alternative
modes of response, then those measures may be said to satisfy conditions of
necessity. The remaining question, then, is whether a kinetic response to cyber-
attacks is likely to satisfy a criterion of discrimination.
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This question needs to be addressed both in principle and as a practical matter. In
principle, the account I give of how some cyber-attacks amount (or contribute) to acts
of violence shows how it is possible that proportionate kinetic defence that inflicts no
more relevant harms than are necessary to diminish threats from cyber-attackers can
also meet a fairly demanding discrimination requirement. Discrimination, I shall
assume, demands (1) that necessary harms be intentionally directed only at those
who are liable to them; (2) liability is a function of moral responsibility for the wrongful
threats to which defensive measures respond.14 Violent Cyber-Attack is defined, as I
have argued, by the double-intentions of an agent. Those responsible for such actions, it
can therefore be argued, are morally responsible for their outcomes in a uniquely
intense way: these outcomes were not merely foreseeable and nor are they intended
in a simple sense; the outcomes, we might say, are ‘hyper-intentional effects.’ That is,
they are effects that are not only intended as outcomes but guaranteed as far as possible
by engaging in techniques that also eliminate key factors that could possibly impede
them. Provided the perpetrators of such attacks may be identified and that the defensive
measures chosen can be targeted in such a way as to discriminate between those
responsible and bystanders in an appropriate way, it appears that they may satisfy the
demands of discrimination in principle. Information about the agents of cyber-attacks,
however, is peculiarly difficult to source and states wishing to respond in a manner that
might deter future attacks are likely to be thwarted in many cases by the ‘attribution
problem.’ So whether kinetic measures may be used defensively in a manner that
satisfies the JW requirement of discrimination in practice may be quite a different
matter.
Finally, whether cyber-attacks may be justifiable as defensive measures against
either other cyber-attacks or kinetic attacks will depend on a similar ethical analysis.
If the cyber measures under consideration are also Violent Cyber-Attacks, then the
destructive harm they are intended to execute along with the vulnerabilities they exploit
or open up as means of ensuring their success ought to be both proportionate to the
threats of harm they defend against and necessary. And they must also be discriminate
in distributing their intended harms in such a way as to respect the immunity of the
innocent. Likewise, where Violent Cyber-Attack occurs within a wider cross-domain
conflict or war that combines both cyber-attack and kinetic warfare, the JIB criteria will
apply. In bello proportionality will demand that whatever measures are used, they
should not cause collateral harms to civilians that are excessive by comparison with the
military advantage they are expected to secure. And all such measures should satisfy
discrimination so far as intended targets are concerned. Satisfying these conditions will
not, on the account offered here, mean that Violent Cyber-Attack ought always to be
preferred to kinetic violence: it is possible in principle that kinetic measures will be
preferable in some instances, whether on the grounds that the harms they inflict are less
severe or that they are targeted more discriminately and with lower rates of collateral
damage.
14 In this regard, I follow the analysis in general terms defended by Jeff McMahan. See, for instance,
McMahan (2009).
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7 Conclusion
The question with which I began concerned whether and how cyber-attacks or ‘cyber
war’ ought to be located in relation to JWT. How we answer it is likely to have
significant practical ramifications with the potential to affect directly the policies
justifiable for governments and to have wide-ranging effects on matters such as the
status of those accused of engaging in hostile cyber-operations during a conflict (see,
for instance, Blank (2015, 101)). The key problem in incorporating cyber-attacks
within JWT is to find a common denominator between them and the sort of armed,
kinetic attack that the theory traditionally deals with. I argued that this cannot be war,
not principally because of the objections that some have raised to the idea of cyberwar
itself, but due to the fact that JWT presently concerns itself with a wider range of
different types of conflict, some a great deal less formalized than war in a traditional
sense. More promising, I have argued, is the concept of violence. To make good this
claim, I offered the ‘Double-Intent’ account of the definition of violence. This, I argued,
not only captures what is distinctive about the range of action types that are classically
associated with the term violence—things like shooting a gun or throwing a punch—
but also identifies something distinctive about a subset of cyber-attacks. These are
attacks which combine the intention to inflict destructive harm (whether on information
or on physical bodies and structures) with the intent to maximize the victim’s vulner-
ability to such harm. Cyber-technologies can achieve this either on their own, after the
fashion of Stuxnet, or in combination with other, non-cyber-technologies, as in the case
of the 2007 Israeli Air Force attack in Syria. In both cases, cyber-attacks correspond
closely to paradigmatic practices of violent attack and, as such, are commensurable
with such attacks. Whether armed force may justifiably be used in defence against such
cyber-attacks in particular contexts may be settled, therefore, on the basis of comparing
the degrees and types of harm threatened by the attackers and the defenders respec-
tively, and the extent to which defensive measures are discriminate.
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